On March 18, 2010, the British Columbia Supreme Court gave its decision in Fraser Health Authority v Jongerden and upheld the ban on the distribution of raw milk in British Columbia. The court granted the injunction sought by the Fraser Health Authority prohibiting individuals from packaging and/or distributing raw milk and/or raw milk products for human consumption.
The Respondents in this case participated in a “cow share” arrangement where shareholders were entitled to receive raw milk and raw milk products under the brand name of “Home on the Range”. The packaging was specifically marked “Not for Sale” in order for the public to understand that the raw milk and raw milk products were available only to the members of the cow share.
The Fraser Health Authority sought an injunction under section 15 of the Public Health Act, which provides that a person must not willingly cause a health hazard or act in a manner that the person knows or ought to know would cause a health hazard.
Section 7 of the Public Health Act Transitional Regulation provides that milk for human consumption that has not been pasteurized at a licensed dairy plant in accordance with the Milk Industry Act is prescribed as a health hazard.
The Respondents relied on a recent Ontario provincial court decision that acquitted a Mr. Schmidt on a number of charges under the Ontario Milk Act for, amongst other things: possessing, distributing or selling milk and milk products which were not pasteurized or sterilized. The Ontario legislation did not contain a provision similar to section 7 of the British Columbia Public Health Act Transitional Regulation deeming raw milk to be a health hazard. The court in Ontario held that Mr. Schmidt had rebutted the presumption that he was in violation of the Ontario legislation.
In granting the injunction applied for by the Fraser Health Authority, the court held that the Ontario decision in R v. Schmidt did not apply in British Columbia because of differences in the wording of the B.C. legislation. The court stated:
 The respondents assert that Schmidt ought to be binding on this court. They say that it stands for the proposition that cow share programs, where raw milk and raw milk products are available only to members of the cow share, are not embraced by s. 15 of the Public Health Act and s. 7 of the Transitional Regulation.
 While the cow share program undertaken by Mr. Schmidt in Ontario is the same or similar to that undertaken by Ms. Jongerden in British Columbia, that is the only similarity to be found. The provisions of the Ontario Milk Act are not similar to the provisions of the B.C. Public Health Act.
 There is no provision in British Columbia’s Public Health Act which creates a rebuttable presumption like that contained in s. 25 of the Ontario Milk Act. It is the view of Kowarsky J.P. that Mr. Schmidt had rebutted the presumption that his milk or milk products were related to marketing within Ontario, because his products were only available to members of the cow share. The Transitional Regulation, on the other hand, is quite clear that milk for human consumption which has not been pasteurized at a licensed dairy plant in accordance with the Milk Industry Act, is a health hazard.
 The question of whether the milk or milk products are distributed to the public or to members of the cow share is of no relevance in British Columbia. Raw milk is deemed to be a health hazard by regulation, and s. 15 of the Public Health Act “prohibits a person from willingly causing a health hazard”.
 Further, the B.C. legislation does not provide the court with the opportunity to consider whether or not raw milk is a health hazard. It does not require that samples of the raw milk be taken or tested or provided to the court. Raw milk is presumed to be a health hazard under s. 7 of the Transitional Regulation.
 There is a further significant distinction between the matter before me and that before Kowarsky J.P. Mr. Schmidt was charged under the provisions of the Ontario HPPA and Milk Act and the crown was required to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The case at bar, however, is a civil matter where the petitioner seeks an injunction in relation to a breach of a statutory provision.
 Based on the foregoing, I decline to follow the Schmidt decision of the Ontario Court of Justice, Provincial Offences Court.
The significance of this case is that it upholds section 7 of the Public Health Act Transitional Regulation. Section 7 deems raw milk to be a health hazard in British Columbia and that avoids the difficulties created by the legislation in other provinces where private cow share operations avoid the intent of the raw milk ban in those provinces by organizing the distribution of raw milk to members of the cow share scheme instead of selling it to the general public.